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Background and Terms of Reference as provided by the requestor
The background and Terms of Reference (ToR) as provided by the European Commission for the present document are reported in Section 1.2 of the scientific opinion on the ad hoc methodology followed for the assessment of the disease to be listed and categorised according to the criteria of Article 5, Annex IV according to Article 9, and 8 within the Animal Health Law (AHL) framework (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017).
1.2.
Interpretation of the Terms of Reference
The interpretation of the ToR is as in Section 1.2 of the scientific opinion on the ad hoc methodology followed for the assessment of the disease to be listed and categorised according to the criteria of Article 5, Annex IV according to Article 9, and 8 within the AHL framework (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017) .
The present document reports the results of assessment on Ebola virus disease according to the criteria of the AHL articles as follows:
• Article 7: Ebola virus disease profile and impacts • Article 5: eligibility of Ebola virus disease to be listed • Article 9: categorisation of Ebola virus disease according to disease prevention and control rules as in Annex IV • Article 8: list of animal species related to Ebola virus disease.
Data and methodologies
The methodology applied in this opinion is described in detail in a dedicated document about the ad hoc method developed for assessing any animal disease for the listing and categorisation of diseases within the AHL framework (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017).
Assessment

Assessment according to Article 7 criteria
This section presents the assessment of Ebola virus disease according to the Article 7 criteria of the AHL and related parameters (see Table 2 of the opinion on methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017)), based on the information contained in the fact-sheet as drafted by the selected disease scientist (see section 2.1 of the scientific opinion on the ad hoc methodology) and amended by the AHAW Panel.
Article 7(a) Disease Profile
Ebola virus (EV) disease (previously known as Ebola haemorrhagic fever) is a zoonotic disease of major concern for human health and certain African wildlife. The disease is caused by four of the five recognised species of the genus Ebola: Ebolavirus (formerly known as Zaire ebolavirus), Sudan ebolavirus, Bundibugyo ebolavirus and Ta € ı Forest ebolavirus Rougeron et al., 2015 ; CDC, online-e; WHO, online-f).
3.1.1.1. Article 7(a)(i) Animal species concerned by the disease
Susceptible animal species
Parameter 1 -Naturally susceptible wildlife species (or family/orders) Species that develop viral haemorrhagic fever, in which the virus has been isolated:
• Western gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) (Leroy et al., 2004a; Rouquet et al., 2005; Wittmann et al., 2007; Reed et al., 2014) • Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) (Georges-Courbot et al., 1997a; Formenty et al., 1999; Georges et al., 1999; Leroy et al., 2004a; Rouquet et al., 2005; Wittmann et al., 2007) Species with asymptomatic infection, in which viral nucleic acids have been detected:
• Franquet's epauletted fruit bat (Epomops franqueti) Pourrut et al., 2007 Pourrut et al., , 2009 Hayman et al., 2012) • Hammer-headed fruit bat (Hypsignathus monstrosus) Pourrut et al., 2007 Pourrut et al., , 2009 Hayman et al., 2012) • Little collared fruitbat (Myonycteris torquata) Pourrut et al., 2007 Pourrut et al., , 2009 • Peters' mouse (Mus setulosus) (Morvan et al., 1999) • Praomys spp. (Morvan et al., 1999) • Greater forest shrew (Sylvisorex ollula) (Morvan et al., 1999) Species with asymptomatic infection, in which antibodies have been detected (WHO, online-f):
• Egyptian fruit bat (Rousettus aegyptiacus) • Leschenault's rousette (Rousettus leschenaultii) (Olival et al., 2013) • Gambian epauletted fruit bat (Epomophorus gambianus) (Hayman et al., 2012) • African straw-coloured fruit bat (Eidolon helvum) (Hayman et al., 2010; Ogawa et al., 2015) • Peter's lesser epauletted fruit bat (Micropteropus pusillus) • Angolan free-tailed bat (Mops condylura) Species of captive, wild-born animals that have been exposed to the virus with unknown history of symptoms and in which antibodies have been detected:
• Mandrill (Mandrillus sphinx) (Leroy et al., 2004b) • Drill (Mandrillus leucophaeus) (Leroy et al., 2004b) • Olive baboon (Papio Anubis) (Leroy et al., 2004b) • De Brazza's monkey (Cercopithecus neglectus) (Leroy et al., 2004b) Full host range is not known. Observed mortality in other wildlife indicates that additional species might be susceptible to Ebola, e.g. among the mandrills (Mandrillus sp.), guenon (Cercopithecus sp.) and other nonhuman primates, as well as forest antelopes (Cephalophus sp.), bush pigs (Potamochoerus porcus), brush-tailed porcupines (Atherurus africanus) and other species (Lahm et al., 2007; Olson et al., 2012; Olivero et al., 2017) .
Parameter 2 -Naturally susceptible domestic species (or family/orders) Species that have been exposed to the virus with unknown history of symptoms and from which antibodies have been detected:
• Dogs (Allela et al., 2005;  WHO, online-f) • Guinea pigs (Stansfield et al., 1982) Parameter 3 -Experimentally susceptible wildlife species (or family/orders) Susceptible species that develop viral haemorrhagic fever:
• Rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) (Geisbert et al., 2015) • Cynomolgus macaques (Macaca fascicularis) (Geisbert et al., 2015) • Marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) (Smither et al., 2015) • Baboon (Papio spp.) (Perry et al., 2012) • African green monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops) (Davis et al., 1997) • Vervet monkey (Chlorocebus pygerythrus) (Bowen et al., 1978) Susceptible species that develop asymptomatic infection, in which nucleic acids were detected and seroconverted (WHO, online-f):
• Egyptian rousette fruit bat (Rousettus aegyptiacus) (Jones et al., 2015; • Wahlberg's epauletted fruit bat (Epomophorus wahlbergi) (Swanepoel et al., 1996) • Angolan free-tailed bat (Mops condylurus) (Swanepoel et al., 1996) • Little free-tailed bat (Tadarida pumila, i.e. Chaerephon pumilus) (Swanepoel et al., 1996) Species susceptible to species-adapted strains only (WHO, online-f):
• Mice (Banadyga et al., 2016; Cheresiz et al., 2016) • Syrian hamster (Mesocricetus auratus) (Wahl-Jensen et al., 2012; Ebihara et al., 2013) Parameter 4 -Experimentally susceptible domestic species (or family/orders) Species that develop viral haemorrhagic fever:
• Domestic ferret (Mustela putorius furo) (Cross et al., 2016; Kozak et al., 2016) Species that develop respiratory disease symptoms:
• Pigs (Kobinger et al., 2011; Weingartl et al., 2012) Species susceptible to species-adapted strains only 4 :
• Guinea pigs (Banadyga et al., 2016; Cheresiz et al., 2016) Species insensitive to infection, no detection of virus nucleic acid but seroconverted (animals purposely inoculated to produce hyperimmune serum):
• Goats (Dedkova, 1993; Kudoyarova-Zubavichene et al., 1999) • Sheep (Dedkova, 1993; Kudoyarova-Zubavichene et al., 1999) • Horses (Krasnianskii et al., 1995; Zheng et al., 2016) Parameter 5 -Wild reservoir species (or family/orders) This is not fully understood, but fruit bats have long been suspected to be reservoir species because: (1) studies have shown asymptomatic infections in the wild and in experimental studies, (2) 13 wild caught specimens have harboured viral nucleic acid, (3) antibodies have been detected in several species, and (4) contact to bats have been suspected to be the origin of human epidemics in West Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan (WHO, 1978; Baron et al., 1983; Leroy et al., 2005; Pourrut et al., 2007; Leroy et al., 2009; Pourrut et al., 2009; Hayman et al., 2010 Hayman et al., , 2012 Olival et al., 2013; Mar ı Sa ez et al., 2015; Ogawa et al., 2015) . However, natural shedding of the virus has not been reported and the virus has not been isolated from wild bats. The suspected links between bats and human outbreaks have not been confirmed and further research is necessary to confirm or identify reservoir species. Great apes (family Hominidae, e.g. chimpanzees and gorillas) are not considered reservoirs given the disease's rapid spread and high case fatality in these species, i.e. they do not fulfil important criteria for a reservoir host (Huijbregts et al., 2003; Olival and Hayman, 2014; Leendertz et al., 2016) .
The susceptibility of Barbary macaque, bat and monkey species present in the European Union (EU) overseas territory is not known.
Parameter 6 -Domestic reservoir species (or family/orders) There are no species recognised so far.
3.1.1.2. Article 7(a)(ii) The morbidity and mortality rates of the disease in animal populations
Mortality
Parameter 3 -Case-fatality rate Bats Pourrut et al., 2007 Pourrut et al., , 2009 Hayman et al., 2010 Hayman et al., , 2012 Olival et al., 2013; Ogawa et al., 2015) Franquet's epauletted fruit bat(Epomops franqueti) (Formenty et al., 1999; Leroy et al., 2004a; Rouquet et al., 2005; Wittmann et al., 2007; Reed et al., 2014) Zoonotic human infections have been reported in several African countries (Pigott et al., 2014; CDC, online-f) . In most cases, the zoonotic origin of infection is still unknown.
Infections have been reported in Democratic Republic of Congo in 1972 Congo in , 1976 Congo in , 1977 Congo in , 1995 Congo in , 2007 Congo in , 2008 Congo in , 2012 Congo in and 2014 In 2007, the index case was a child who had presumably been infected through the sweat of her asymptomatic father who had bought fruit bat meat at the local market ; however, none of the numerous hunters who took part in the large annual mass hunting of the bats were among the first to succumb to the disease and it has been questioned if fruit bats were indeed the origin of the outbreak (Leendertz et al., 2016) . In 2014, the index case was a woman who had been in contact with a non-human primates (NHP) carcass (unidentified species); however, no samples were obtained for confirmation of Ebola virus infection in the carcass (Maganga et al., 2014) . No source of infection was suspected in the other outbreaks.
All outbreaks in Gabon (1994 , January and July 1996 , 2001 and Republic of Congo (2001 , 2002 , 2005 were epidemiologically linked with infected gorillas, chimpanzees and duikers through hunting or scavenging; the source of three of these outbreaks were also laboratory confirmed (Georges-Courbot et al., 1997b; Georges et al., 1999; Rouquet et al., 2005) .
In Côte d'Ivoire in 1994, one researcher was infected when performing a necropsy on an infected chimpanzee carcass (Formenty et al., 1999) .
In Sudan in 1976 and 1979, the outbreaks were epidemiologically linked to a cotton factory where insectivorous bats were roosting; in the outbreak in 2004 no such link was suspected (WHO, 1978; Baron et al., 1983) .
In Guinea in 2013, the index case was a 2-year-old child who had likely been in direct or indirect contact with a large colony of insectivorous bat (Mops condylurus) roosting in a hollow tree, however, this link was not confirmed (Mar ı Sa ez et al., 2015) . No infectious source could be identified in the outbreaks in Uganda in 2000 and May and November 2012 Serological surveys indicate that contacts with the virus outside outbreak times have occurred (Heymann et al., 1980; Mathiot et al., 1989; Becquart et al., 2010; Schoepp et al., 2014; Mulangu et al., 2016) .
3.1.1.4. Article 7(a)(iv) The resistance to treatments, including antimicrobial resistance Parameter 1 -Resistant strain to any treatment even at laboratory level No treatment is licensed for human or animal use (please see section below). 3.1.1.5. Article 7(a)(v) The persistence of the disease in an animal population or the environment
Animal population
Parameter 1 -Duration of infectious period in animals Bats: Not known. Viral nucleic acid has been detected but the virus has not been isolated from wild bats Pourrut et al., 2007 Pourrut et al., , 2009 Hayman et al., 2010 Hayman et al., , 2012 Olival et al., 2013; Ogawa et al., 2015) . In one experimental study of the insectivorous bats species Mops condylurus and Chaerephon pumilus and the fruit bat species Epomophorus wahlbergi, the virus was isolated in blood and tissue up to 3 weeks post infection and in one of the infected fruit bats the virus was also isolated once from faeces (Swanepoel et al., 1996) indicating that the infectious period in susceptible bat species may be more than 3 weeks, although no natural shedding of Ebola has been detected (Kuhn, 2008; Olival and Hayman, 2014; Schoepp et al., 2014) .
Non-human primates (NHP): The biological aspects of the disease process are similar in humans and NHP and individuals are currently presumed infectious when clinical symptoms occur (Kuhn, 2008; Olival and Hayman, 2014; Schoepp et al., 2014) . Experimental infections show that death in NHPs usually occur ca. 5-8 days post-infection but can occur up to 14 days after infection depending on dose and species of virus (Geisbert et al., 2009; Nakayama and Saijo, 2013) . Filoviruses could be isolated up to 20 days after onset of infection from surviving NHPs (Fisher-Hoch et al., 1992) .
One study reported ape carcasses remaining infectious in the rainforest for 3-4 days; another determined the virus to remain viable up to 7 days in macaque carcasses (Leroy et al., 2004a; Prescott et al., 2015) .
The virus is not inactivated by freezing or refrigeration (Chepurnov et al., 1995; Piercy et al., 2010) . It is uncertain how long EV survives in carcasses and meat under different environmental conditions, e.g. salting and drying (EFSA, 2014 (EFSA, , 2015b .
Parameter 2 -Presence and duration of latent infection period
The occurrence of latent infection is not known in bats nor in chimpanzees and gorillas.
Parameter 3 -Presence and duration of the pathogen in healthy carriers
The infection is asymptomatic in bats. Studies of wild bats caught 5 months apart in a human outbreak area showed rapid clearance of the infection . The virus could be recovered up to 3 weeks in experimentally infected, asymptomatic bats (Swanepoel et al., 1996) .
Semen from men who survived the infection may remain infectious for 179 days or more after onset of symptoms (Mate et al., 2015) ; such viral persistence may also occur in healthy great apes (Leendertz et al., 2017) . In one case, EV genetic material could be detected after 565 days but the test could not tell if live virus was present and capable of spreading disease (Soka et al., 2016) .
Environment
Parameter 4 -Length of survival (dpi) of the agent and/or detection of DNA in selected matrices (soil, water, air) from the environment (scenarios: high and low T) Data exist only from experiments which are usually mimicking hospital settings and are not based on observations in nature. In darkness (Sagripanti et al., 2010) 3.1.1.6. Article 7(a)(vi) The routes and speed of transmission of the disease between animals, and, when relevant, between animals and humans
Routes of transmission
Parameter 1 -Types of routes of transmission from animal to animal (horizontal, vertical)
Transmission chains and routes are not known for most animals. NHP-to-NHP transmission: Horizontal transmission. Direct contact, conjunctival and oral contact with infected individuals, carcasses and body fluids Mire et al., 2016) . Transmission via sexual contact with surviving males is theoretically possible as this route has been identified in humans (Mate et al., 2015) . It is not known how the infection enters into the NHP population (Leendertz et al., 2017) .
Bat-to-bat transmission: Such transmission is not confirmed. Virus has not been isolated from wild bats and virus shedding in wild bats has not been detected Pourrut et al., 2007 Pourrut et al., , 2009 Hayman et al., 2010 Hayman et al., , 2012 Olival et al., 2013; Olival and Hayman, 2014; Ogawa et al., 2015) . Experimentally infected bats (Rousettus aegyptiacus) did not infect other in-contact bats of the same species .
Aerosol transmission in laboratory settings:
Experimental aerosol infection documented in NHP, pigs, mice, and guinea pigs Kobinger et al., 2011; Reed et al., 2011; Weingartl et al., 2012; Zumbrun et al., 2012a,b; Twenhafel et al., 2013 Twenhafel et al., , 2015 Smither et al., 2015) .
Aerosol transmission reported from guinea pigs to guinea pigs, pigs to pigs, pigs to NHP and from NHP to NHP (Dedkova, 1993; Jaax et al., 1995; Kobinger et al., 2011; Weingartl et al., 2012; Wong et al., 2015) .
In these experiments, the animals were housed close together and droplet infection cannot be excluded. Filoviruses have very little or no capacity to be airborne, i.e. no inhalation of infectious particles takes place at a distance from the source. Transmission by air is not similar to influenza or other airborne infection and the virus does not transmit from an infected person to a susceptible person that is located at a distance (Mekibib and Ari € en, 2016) .
Parameter 2 -Types of routes of transmission between animals and humans (direct, indirect, including food-borne)
Direct contact via hunting, scavenging or butchering of infected NHP or other infected wildlife. There is epidemiological evidence of such transmission in the human outbreaks in Gabon and Republic of Congo in 1994 and 1996 and 2000 -2005  three outbreaks were also laboratory confirmed by isolation of virus in carcasses from gorillas, chimpanzees and duiker (Georges et al., 1999; Rouquet et al., 2005; Nkoghe et al., 2011) . The risk factor for infection was related to the activities of hunting and handling the carcasses, not to the consumption of meat. Virus is killed by heating for 60 min at 60°C or boiling for 5 min (CDC, online-d). Viruses with structural lipids (e.g. Ebola) survive best in dry air with a relative humidity less than 50-70% (Cox, 1995) .
Direct contact with bats or bat meat have been suspected, but not confirmed, to be the source of infection see Section 3.1.1.3.
Speed of transmission
Parameter 3 -Incidence between animals and, when relevant, between animals and humans Measures of speed of transmission between animals or between animals and humans are not known.
Parameter 4 -Transmission rate (beta) (from R 0 and infectious period) between animals and, when relevant, between animals and humans The transmission rate is not known. Due to the physiological and sociable similarities between great apes and humans, the transmission rate could be comparable to what has been observed in humans: In the human outbreak in West Africa in 2013-2016, the range of estimated mean value of the basic R 0 and transmission rate (for the outbreak in general and for the three main countries individually) were 1.55-2.73 and 0.20-0.45 per day, respectively (Althaus, 2014; Ahmad et al., 2016) . Previous estimates of R 0 in other outbreaks have ranged between 1.33 and 2.7 (Chowell and Nishiura, 2014) . Great apes are highly sociable and larger outbreaks have been observed in these species (Caillaud et al., 2006; Leendertz et al., 2017) .
3.1.1.7 Article 7(a)(vii) The absence or presence and distribution of the disease in the Union, and, where the disease is not present in the Union, the risk of its introduction into the Union
Presence and distribution
Parameter 1 -Map where the disease is present in EU
The disease is not present in the EU; limited to the tropical belt of Africa (Pigott et al., 2014;  WHO, online-f).
Parameter 2 -Type of epidemiological occurrence (sporadic, epidemic, endemic) at MS level Sporadic cases are reported in humans who have travelled, or who have been medically rescued, from West Africa during the 2013-2016 outbreaks (ECDC, online-e).
Risk of introduction
Parameter 3 -Routes of possible introduction • Infected humans travelling from outbreak areas (ECDC, online-e).
• Import of contaminated bushmeat from Africa, although no cases have yet been reported out of the primary outbreaks locations due to the consumption of imported bushmeat (EFSA, 2014 (EFSA, , 2015b . Bushmeat is meat from wild animals (endangered or not) native to Africa (Swamy and Pinedo-Vasquez, 2014 ; BCTF, online).
• Import of infected NHP (Rollin et al., 1999) . • Food other than bushmeat has never been identified as associated with human cases in any of the reported outbreaks. Other food products such as fruits and vegetables are unlikely routes of introduction (EFSA, 2014 (EFSA, , 2015b . • France, Charles de Gaulle airport: 273 tonnes per year, mainly from Central Africa. Average consignments of bushmeat were over 20 kg (Chaber et al., 2010 ).
• Switzerland: 249 kg/year, mainly from West Africa. Medium weight of consignments was 4.5 kg (Falk et al., 2013 ).
• Austria: in 8 months bushmeat was confiscated six times (Schoder et al., 2015) .
Nevertheless, the quantities mentioned above are just examples and they are not representative of the real imported amounts, which are likely to be much higher, though impossible to quantify with more accuracy. Furthermore, it should be considered that not all bushmeat is from animals susceptible to EV and contaminated by the virus.
Parameter 5 -Duration of infectious period in animal and/or commodity Please see Section 3.1.1.5 Parameter 1. Carcasses of NHP have been documented to remain infectious up to 7 days after death . Infectious period in wild bats is not known; in experimental infections, the virus could be recovered after 3 weeks (Swanepoel et al., 1996) .
The virus viability is prolonged by freezing or refrigeration (Chepurnov et al., 1995; Piercy et al., 2010; Reed et al., 2011) . Please, see also Section 3.1.1.5 Parameter 4. It is uncertain how long EV survives in carcasses and meat under different treatments, e.g. salting, smoking and drying which is commonly done with bushmeat (EFSA, 2014 (EFSA, , 2015b . It is difficult to provide a figure or a range of values of the overall risk of introduction of Ebola through the different routes because a number of factors necessary for such estimation are not known and some parameters might not be possible to estimate. The risk and uncertainties in estimating such risk of introduction through the different routes are described in general terms below.
Humans travelling from outbreak areas Such introduction has already been proven possible several times. A medically evacuated patient entering a well prepared health care setting carries less risk of introduction to the general public than a person who is unaware that he/she is infected when leaving the outbreak area. Clearly, the larger outbreak and the more travellers from the area the higher risk of introduction.
Import of bush meat
The outcome of the assessment is the probability for at least a single case of human infected by Ebola virus in Europe due to transmission via handling and preparation (carried out by consumers or staff handling the food in kitchens immediately prior to consumption) and consumption of bush meat illegally is imported from infected areas. This probability is the result of a combination of several necessary steps: (1) the bush meat has to be contaminated with Ebola virus at the point of origin;
(2) the bush meat has to be (illegally) introduced into the EU; (3) the imported bush meat needs to contain viable virus when it reaches the person; (4) the person has to be exposed to the virus; and (5) the person needs to get infected following exposure.
Due to lack of data and knowledge, which results in very high uncertainty, it is not possible to estimate that risk. However, considering all the elements in these steps, and based on: (i) the limited number of outbreaks that have been reported to date in spite of the routine consumption of bush meat in that continent, (ii) the handling of bush meat in Europe not involving high risk practices such as hunting and butchering, and (iii) the assumed low overall consumption of bush meat in Europe, it can be assumed that the potential for introduction and transmission of Ebola virus via bush meat in Europe is currently low. It should be noted that the public health consequences of such an event (a single human case of Ebola virus occurring in Europe) would be very serious given the high lethality and potential for secondary transmission. In addition, it should be noted that the information considered in this opinion is largely based on historic Ebola outbreaks and not specifically the recent wide outbreak in West Africa (EFSA, 2014) .
Import of non-human primates
Export quarantine lasting longer than the virus incubation time should in theory ensure that infected animals are not exported, unless the animals could come in contact with the virus during the stay in the export quarantine. Imported primates are not exposed directly to the general public; avoidance of infection of personnel at import quarantine stations relies on training and infection prevention. The route of infection to animal care workers has been demonstrated when Ebola Reston virus was introduced into primate quarantine station in the USA from infected primates coming from Philippines.
Food other than bush meat
In this assessment, 'top-down' (e.g. surveillance-based) and 'bottom-up' (e.g. using the standard microbial risk assessment paradigm, where the agent is followed through the food chain to produce a prediction of risk to human health relative to other agents and/or foods) approaches were combined. Using the 'top-down' approach, it was concluded that food other than bush meat has never been associated with human cases in any of the reported outbreaks. There is no evidence for food-borne transmission of Ebola virus to persons in the EU.
Using the 'bottom-up' approach, it was concluded that the necessary sequence of events in the risk pathway involves many hurdles: (1) the raw food to be exported has to be contaminated with Ebola virus at the point of origin; (2) the imported food needs to contain viable virus at sufficient load to cause human infection when it arrives in the EU; (3) the person has to be exposed to the virus through the handling and preparation (both carried out by consumers or staff handling the food in kitchens immediately prior to consumption) as well as consumption of contaminated food; and (4) the person needs to get infected following exposure. Each of these steps is necessary in order for a case of disease to occur and none have been documented to happen in practice. Due to lack of data and knowledge, which results in very high uncertainty, it is not possible to quantify the risk of food-borne transmission of Ebola virus derived from the consumption of these imported foods, or in fact whether or not this mode of transmission could occur at all.
The overall conclusions of both 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches are consistent and suggest that the risk of food-borne transmission of Ebola virus via food other than bush meat imported into the EU remains a theoretical possibility only and has never been demonstrated in practice. However, the uncertainty in the combined assessment is considered high given the lack of data (EFSA, 2015b). Table 3 for test performance)
Control tools
Parameter 2 -Existence of control tools In Europe:
• Isolation of human cases • Contact tracing (ECDC, online-b) • Disinfection of contaminated areas with 0.5% sodium hypochlorite as recommended by WHO (online-c).
• Incineration of imported bushmeat (CDC, online-a).
• Euthanasia of infected animals imported from Africa.
There are no licensed treatments or vaccines, however several are in human clinical trials (please see below).
In outbreak areas, safe burial practice (see Section 3.1.5.2) and avoidance of bushmeat are also recommended. The disease is not present.
The loss of production due to the disease Parameter 2 -Proportion of production losses (%) by epidemic/endemic situation This is not applicable. The disease is of human health concern.
3.1.2.2. Article 7(b)(ii) The impact of the disease on human health
Transmissibility between animals and humans
Parameter 1 -Types of routes of transmission between animals and humans Contact with infected animals, carcasses, meat and body fluids from infected wildlife. So far, the virus has been isolated from carcasses of chimpanzees, gorillas and duikers however infection is likely to occur in additional species (Leroy et al., 2004a; Rouquet et al., 2005; Lahm et al., 2007; Olivero et al., 2017) .
The risk of infection from bat meat is unknown. The reservoir host is not determined hence additional infective sources and infection routes may exist.
Parameter 2 -Incidence of zoonotic cases Since 1972, 26 cases of zoonotic transmission are known to have occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa (Pigott et al., 2014;  WHO, online-f). The population of Sub-Saharan Africa is 856 million people (WB, online).
Transmissibility between humans
Parameter 3 -Human-to-human transmission is sufficient to sustain sporadic cases or community-level outbreak Human-to-human transmission occurred in all but four of the known zoonotic transmissions. Before the epidemic in West Africa in 2013-2016, where the number of recorded cases was 28.600, outbreaks included up to 425 people maximum (CDC, online-f).
Parameter 4 -Sporadic, endemic, epidemic, or pandemic potential
The disease occurs sporadically in Africa. The disease was, however, widespread in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 2013-2016 epidemics and the infection was imported into several countries (Mali, Senegal, Nigeria, the USA, Spain, Italy, France, Switzerland, Germany, the United Kingdom, Norway) through infected medical personnel and international travels. In Nigeria, the infection spread to 19 people (WHO, online-a). The WHO declared the Ebola epidemic to be a Public Health Emergency of International Concern in August 2014 (WHO, online-b).
The severity of human forms of the disease . The years of lives lost (YLL) due to Ebola for that year was estimated to be 5.500. In total, 11,300 people were recorded to have died between December 2013-April 2016, mainly in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia (CDC, online-f). The population of these three countries combined is 22.5 million people (WB, online).
Up until 2013, the overall number of recorded deaths in Sub-Saharan African countries since the disease was detected in 1976 was ca. 1,500 (CDC, online-f). The population of sub-Saharan Africa is 856 million people (WB, online).
The availability of effective prevention or medical treatment in humans
Parameter 6 -Availability of medical treatment and their effectiveness (therapeutic effect and any resistance)
No Ebola specific medical treatment is licensed. Experimental treatments are in clinical trials (see below). Treatment relies on supportive care. WHO recommends use of convalescent blood products (WHO, online-d).
Parameter 7 -Availability of vaccines and their effectiveness (reduced morbidity) So far, no vaccine is licensed. Several vaccine candidates are in clinical trials (see below). Only one has been tested for efficacy in humans; the rVSV-EBOV vaccine candidate protected 100% of the 4,123 vaccinated in-contact people in a ring-vaccination trial during the 2013-2016 epidemic (Henao-Restrepo et al., 2017).
Article 7(b)(iii) The impact of the disease on animal welfare
Parameter 1 -Severity of clinical signs at case level and related level and duration of impairment NHP develop haemorrhagic fever with severe clinical signs similar to humans (Kuhn, 2008; Leendertz et al., 2017) . Experimental infections show that deaths in NHPs usually occur ca. 5-8 days post-infection but up to 14 days have been recorded depending on dose and species of virus (Geisbert et al., 2009; Nakayama and Saijo, 2013) . Ebola infection is not detected in wildlife in EU. In Africa, large outbreaks in great apes (e.g. chimpanzees and gorillas) have led to population declines of 98% in some places and the disease is of concern for the survival of these endangered species (Leendertz et al., 2017) . Observed mortality in other wildlife during human outbreaks indicate that additional species might be susceptible, e.g. mandrills (Mandrillus sp.), guenon (Cercopithecus sp.) and other NHP, as well as forest antelopes (Cephalophus sp.), bush pigs (Potamochoerus porcus), brush-tailed porcupines (Atherurus africanus) and other animals (Lahm et al., 2007; Olson et al., 2012) . The infection is asymptomatic in bats (Swanepoel et al., 1996; Leroy et al., 2005) .
Environment
Parameter 3 -Capacity of the pathogen to persist in the environment and cause mortality in wildlife The reservoir and/or environment maintaining the virus between recorded outbreaks is not known; central drivers involved in virus spillover are wildlife hunting, deforestation/forest fragmentation, and demographic changes of wildlife EFSA, 2015a; Leendertz, 2016) .
For stability of the virus outside hosts, please see Section 3.1.1.5 Parameter 4.
Article 7(c) Its potential to generate a crisis situation and its potential use in bioterrorism
Parameter 1 -Listed in OIE/CFSPH classification of pathogens It is not listed (OIE, online-b).
Parameter 2 -Listed in the Encyclopaedia of Bioterrorism Defence of Australia Group
It is listed (Berger, 2005) .
Parameter 3 -Included in any other list of potential bio-agro-terrorism agents It is listed, including: Table 3 , with an indication of the test performance and the matrix sample to be used. The positive and negative predictive values can only be estimated using data from a crosssectional study or other population-based study in which valid prevalence estimated can be obtained. No OIE certified diagnostic tool exists (OIE, online-a). 
Article 7(d)(ii) Vaccination
No vaccine is licensed. Table 4 shows vaccine candidates that are in the most advanced stages of clinical trials, and their effectiveness tested so far. Additional candidates are under development and evaluation (Martins et al., 2016; ECDC, online-d) .
Only one vaccine candidate has been tested for efficacy in humans; the rVSV-EBOV vaccine candidate protected 100% of the 4,123 vaccinated people in a ring-vaccination trial during the 2013-2016 epidemic (WHO, online-d). Duration of protection in humans not known for any candidate. Limited data on duration of protection in animal models; up to 18 months in rodent model (rVSV-ZEBOV) has been documented (Wong et al., 2015) .
Article 7(d)(iii) Medical treatments
Availability
Parameter 1 -Types of drugs available on the market No Ebola specific treatment is licensed. Table 5 shows experimental treatment candidates that are in the most advanced stages of clinical trials. Additional treatment candidates are under development and evaluation (ECDC, online-d; WHO, online-e). The antiviral drug favipiravir in Table 5 is licensed for human use against influenza in Japan (Furuta et al., 2013) . Convalescent blood/plasma is currently the priority treatment option of WHO based on empirical evidence (WHO, online-d). The use of whole blood or plasma from survivors does not require an EU authorisation and is the responsibility of National Competent Authorities for Blood and Blood Components (ECDC, online-a). Wong et al., 2014; Huttner et al., 2015; Agnandji et al., 2016; Marzi et al., 2016; Henao-Restrepo et al., 2017; Regules et al., 2017) 
Effectiveness
Parameter 3 -Therapeutic effects on the field (effectiveness) See Table 5 . Efficacy in humans is not determined for any treatment. Despite perceived success in the few treated on compassionate grounds, their efficacy determination remains elusive due to other interventions (WHO, online-e).
Preliminary studies of favipiravir showed that this drug may increase survival rate and reduce viral load in EVD patients (Bai et al., 2016; Sissoko et al., 2016) . In a retrospective clinical case series that was performed for PCR-confirmed EVD-patients in a hospital in Sierra Leone, 56.4% (22/39) of EVD-patients treated with WHO-recommended therapy plus favipiravir recovered in comparison with 35.3% (30/85) of the control EVD-patients that were treated with WHO-recommended therapy only, 52.9% of patients who received favipiravir had a > 100-fold viral load reduction, compared with only 16.7% of patients in the control group (Bai et al., 2016) .
Feasibility
Parameter 4 -Way of administration See Table 5 .
Article 7(d)(iv) Biosecurity measures
Parameter 1 -Available biosecurity measures • Regular updates on the availability of licensed vaccines and treatments: this is likely to change rapidly (see section on vaccines and treatments) (Borio et al., 2002; Bray, 2003; Sprenger and Coulombier, 2014; Cenciarelli et al., 2015) ;
• Prevention of access to virus stocks: Reduce possibilities for theft of virus from laboratories or during outbreaks;
• Security at airports and other high risk places for bioterrorism attacks; • Quarantine and biosafety routines at centres and veterinary inspection posts for non-human primates imported;
• Improved means of detection of deliberately induced disease outbreaks: recognition of an unusually large number of similar cases of severe illness over a short period of time, rapid medical recognition and rapid laboratory confirmation; (McCarthy, 2014; Qiu et al., 2014) Phase II Monoclonal antibodies IV MIL-77 is a similar product rVSV-EBOV (Marzi et al., 2011 (Marzi et al., , 2016 Phase III Virus-vectored vaccine IM* Vaccine has potential for post-exposure treatment BCX4430 (Taylor et al., 2016) Phase I Antiviral drug IM *: Mucosal (oral or intranasal) in mouse and macaque model (Qiu et al., 2009 ).
• Prevention of person-to-person transmission: isolation and health care facilities, personal protection and reliable decontamination procedures;
• Contact-tracing: rapid identification and follow-up of possibly infected people.
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 -Effectiveness of biosecurity measures in preventing the pathogen introduction Vaccination: Should efficient vaccines become available, they could prevent introduction of the pathogen in high-risk populations such as airport security personnel, veterinarians and animal handlers at primate importation centres, and health care employees. However, the unpredictable introduction routes of terrorist attacks make it difficult to identify all possible target populations for vaccination programmes.
Virus theft prevention: High level security and personnel control in laboratories reduce the likelihood of theft. Virus could however have been acquired by terrorist groups in the past. Acquisition of virus from infected patients or animals during outbreaks is possible.
Airport security: Unsuspicious material and possibly small volume of virus containing substance could be difficult to detect. Non-travellers can also enter airports.
Quarantine and biosafety routines at non-human primates import centres: Provided high-quality standards and routines this should be efficient to prevent virus introduction.
Other measures are not likely to be effective in preventing pathogen introduction (Borio et al., 2002; Bray, 2003; Sprenger and Coulombier, 2014; Cenciarelli et al., 2015) .
Feasibility
Parameter 3 -Feasibility of biosecurity measure • Vaccination and treatments: Should vaccines and/or treatments become available, vaccination is feasible.
• Prevention of access to virus stocks is unfeasible due to the possible existence of unregistered virus stocks and access to infectious material in outbreaks.
• Security: broadening security measures to include screening of travellers for potentially infectious biological material is theoretically feasible; however, it is unfeasible to control all airport visitors.
• Prevention of virus introduction at NHP import centres is feasible provided high-quality quarantine and biosafety standards.
• Improved means of detection of deliberately induced disease outbreaks: Feasible. It requires preparedness plans and available material.
• Prevention of person-to-person transmission: Feasible. It requires preparedness plans and available material.
• Contact tracing: Feasible. It requires preparedness and available material. A SMS system for follow up persons can be used (Tracey et al., 2015) .
Article 7(d)(v) Restrictions on the movement of animals and products
Availability Parameter 1 -Available movement restriction measures Avoid import of NHP from Africa.
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 -Effectiveness of restriction of animal movement in preventing the between-farm spread This is not applicable. Restriction of farm animal movement in the EU is not indicated.
Feasibility
Parameter 3 -Feasibility of restriction of animal movement Avoidance of import of non-human primates from Africa is feasible; several other supplying countries exist (Hunsmann, 2003) .
Article 7(d)(vi) Killing of animals
Availability
Parameter 1 -Available methods for killing animals Euthanasia of animals imported from Africa is available. There is no indication for killing EU animals.
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 -Effectiveness of killing animals (at farm level or within the farm) for reducing/stopping spread of the disease This is not applicable. There is no indication for killing EU animals.
Feasibility
Parameter 3 -Feasibility of killing animals It is feasible to euthanise animals imported from Africa. There is no indication for killing EU animals. Not applicable. Culling of farm animals in the EU is not indicated.
Parameter 3 -Cost of surveillance and monitoring
There is no data on the cost of surveillance and monitoring.
Parameter 4 -Trade loss (bans, embargoes, sanctions) by animal product
There are no costs because no restriction of EU animals or animal products is indicated.
Parameter 5 -Importance of the disease for the affected sector (% loss or € lost compared to business amount of the sector) Not applicable for farm animals. Losses and costs are associated with the prevention and effect of human disease and deaths.
3.1.5.2. Article 7(e)(ii) The societal acceptance of disease prevention and control measures Due to cultural issues, there were social resistance to Ebola control measures (for example, safe burial including avoiding washing and touching the dead body (WHO, online-h) in West Africa (Fairhead, online) . Such resistance is unlikely to occur in the EU.
For imported great apes, quarantine and biosafety measures are suggested. Euthanasia should be considered, if the animal is positive. Considering the severity of the symptoms it might be the most action to take in line with animal welfare, although considering these are endangered species of great apes, this may be a sensitive issue. 
Environment
Parameter 1 -Use and potential residuals of biocides or medical drugs in environmental compartments (soil, water, feed, manure) Sodium chlorite, recommended disinfection agent by WHO (Cook et al., 2015 ; WHO, online-c) is widely used in industrial cleaning and in private households. Due to its high reactivity and instability, it rapidly disappears in the environment. Sodium hydrochlorite is toxic to aquatic animals; it is however rapidly inactivated in organic matter such as in wastewater and sewage. The role of hypochlorite pollution is assumed as negligible. No secondary poisoning has been considered, hypochlorite not being transferred in the trophic chain (ECHA, online).
Biodiversity
Parameter 2 -Mortality in wild species
No control measures in European wildlife are indicated.
Assessment according to Article 5 criteria
This section presents the results of the expert judgement on the criteria of Article 5 of the AHL about Ebola virus disease (Table 6 ). The expert judgement was based on Individual and Collective Behavioural Aggregation (ICBA) approach described in detail in the opinion on the methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017). Experts have been provided with information of the disease fact-sheet mapped into Article 5 criteria (see supporting information, Annex A), based on that the experts indicate their Y/N or 'na' judgement on each criterion of Article 5, and the reasoning supporting their judgement.
The minimum number of judges in the judgement was ten. The expert judgement was conducted as described in the methodological opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017) . For details on the interpretation of the questions, see Appendix B of the methodological opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017). As from the legal text of the AHL, a disease is considered eligible to be listed as laid down in Article 5 if it fulfils all criteria of the first set from A(i) to A(v) and at least one of the second set of criteria from B(i) to B(v). According to the assessment methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017), a criterion is considered fulfilled when the outcome is 'Yes'. According to the results shown in Table 6 , Ebola virus disease complies with all criteria of the first set and with two criteria of the second set, therefore it is considered eligible to be listed as laid down in Article 5 of the AHL.
Assessment according to Article 9 criteria
This section presents the results of the expert judgement on the criteria of Annex IV referring to categories as in Article 9 of the AHL about Ebola virus disease (Tables 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11) . The expert judgement was based on ICBA approach described in detail in the opinion on the methodology. Experts have been provided with information of the disease fact-sheet mapped into Article 9 criteria (see supporting information, Annex A), based on that the experts indicate their Y/N or 'na' judgement on each criterion of Article 9, and the reasoning supporting their judgement. The minimum number of judges in the judgement was 10. The expert judgement was conducted as described in the methodological opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017) . For details on the interpretation of the questions, see Appendix B of the methodological opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017) .
At least one criterion to be met by the disease: In addition to the criteria set out above at point A(i)-A(v), the disease needs to fulfil at least one of the following criteria B(i)
The disease causes or could cause significant negative effects in the Union on animal health, or poses or could pose a significant risk to public health due to its zoonotic character At least one criterion to be met by the disease: In addition to the criteria set out above at point 1-2.4, the disease needs to fulfil at least one of the following criteria 3
The disease has a zoonotic potential with significant consequences on public health, including epidemic or pandemic potential OR possible significant threats to food safety NC 4
The disease has a significant impact on the economy of the Union, causing substantial costs, mainly related to its direct impact on the health and productivity of animals The disease may result in high morbidity with in general low mortality N At least one criterion to be met by the disease:
In addition to the criteria set out above at point 1-2.4, the disease needs to fulfil at least one of the following criteria 3
The disease has a zoonotic potential with significant consequences on public health, including epidemic potential OR possible significant threats to food safety Y 4
The disease has a significant impact on the economy of the Union, causing substantial costs, mainly related to its direct impact on the health and productivity of animals 
Non-consensus questions
This section displays the assessment related to each criterion of Annex IV referring to the categories of Article 9 of the AHL where no consensus was achieved in form of tables (Tables 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17) . The proportion of Y, N or`na 0 answers are reported, followed by the list of different supporting views for each answer. The disease usually does not result in high morbidity and has negligible or no mortality AND often the most observed effect of the disease is production loss N At least one criterion to be met by the disease:
The disease has a zoonotic potential with significant consequences on public health, or possible significant threats to food safety Y 4
The disease has a significant impact on the economy of parts of the Union, mainly related to its direct impact on certain types of animal production systems • The disease is highly transmissible in humans and thus potentially also in great apes.
Supporting Yes for 2.1 (cat.B,C):
• Based on R 0 values reported in humans, the transmission is not high.
• Not all Ebola strains are highly transmissible.
Reasoning supporting the judgement Supporting Yes:
• Experimental aerosol infection documented in NHP, pigs, mice, and guinea pigs.
• EV survival in water at 21 or 27°C can be for days, so the disease might be potentially waterborne.
Supporting No:
• Direct contact with body fluid is the main route of spread.
• According to ECDC, Ebola virus disease is not an airborne disease.
• Aerosol transmission has been demonstrated only in experimental conditions, while the major route is direct transmission.
• Survival in water does not necessarily imply waterborne transmission of infection.
• Flaviviruses have very little or no capacity to be transmitted by the airborne route.
Supporting na:
• Transmission chains and routes are not known for most animals.
• Animals (NHPs) can be experimentally affected.
• Naturally susceptible species in the EU are present in zoos.
• Pigs can be experimentally infected and they may develop a respiratory form of the disease. • The EV disease leads to potential significant consequences to public health with epidemic potential although without pandemic potential. According to the definition of a pandemic by ECDC, 'an epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very wide area, crossing international boundaries and usually affecting a large number of people', the introduction of EV into EU would not lead to such a big scale spread, but it would be rather contained due to implementation of control and hygienic measures.
• In the 2013-2016 epidemic in Africa, the impact on labour markets was catastrophic.
• EV disease could have an impact on labour markets in the EU, but not related specifically to agricultural production.
• The impact on society and labour markets would depend on the extent of epidemics in humans. It may have potentially an impact on domestic species in the EU, but not currently.
Supporting No:
• No domestic species were affected during the outbreaks in Africa, further the possible role of pigs (which are experimentally susceptible to Ebola) remains mostly unclear. Therefore, the impact on labour market is not significant due to its effect purely on domestic species. 3.3.2. Outcome of the assessment of criteria in Annex IV for Ebola virus disease for the purpose of categorisation as in Article 9 of the AHL As from the legal text of the AHL, a disease is considered fitting in a certain category (A, B, C, D or E corresponding to point (a) to point (e) of Article 9(1) of the AHL) if it is eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) and fulfils all criteria of the first set from 1 to 2.4 and at least one of the second set of criteria from 3 to 5(d) as shown in Tables 7-11. According to the assessment methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017), a criterion is considered fulfilled when the outcome is 'Yes'.
A description of the outcome of the assessment of criteria in Annex IV for Ebola for the purpose of categorisation as in Article 9 of the AHL is presented in Table 17 .
According to the assessment here performed, Ebola complies with the following criteria of the sections 1-5 of Annex IV of the AHL for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to in points (a) to (e) of Article 9(1): 1) To be assigned to category A, a disease needs to comply with all criteria of the first set (1, 2.1-2.4) and according to the assessment Ebola complies with criteria 1 and 2.4 and the assessment was inconclusive on compliance with criteria 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. To be eligible for category A, a disease needs to comply additionally with one of the criteria of the second set (3, 4, 5a-d) and Ebola disease does not comply with criteria 4, 5b, 5c and 5d and the assessment is inconclusive on compliance with criteria 3 and 5a. 2) To be assigned to category B, a disease needs to comply with all criteria of the first set (1, 2.1-2.4) and according to the assessment Ebola disease complies with criterion 2.3, does not comply with criteria 1 and 2.4 and the assessment is inconclusive on compliance with criteria 2.1 and 2.2. To be eligible for category B, a disease needs to comply additionally with one of the criteria of the second set (3, 4, 5a-d) and Ebola disease complies with criterion 3 and does not comply with criteria 4, 5b, 5c and 5d, and the assessment is inconclusive on compliance with criterion 5a. 3) To be assigned to category C, a disease needs to comply with all criteria of the first set (1, 2.1-2.4) and according to the assessment Ebola disease complies with criteria 2.2 and 2.3, does not comply with criteria 1 and 2.4 and the assessment is inconclusive on compliance with criterion 2.1. To be eligible for category B, a disease needs to comply additionally with one of the criteria of the second set (3, 4, 5a-d) and Ebola complies with criterion 3, does not comply with criteria 4, 5b, 5c and 5d the assessment is inconclusive on compliance with criterion 5a. 4) To be assigned to category D, a disease needs to comply with criteria of section 1, 2, 3 or 5 of Annex IV of the AHL and with the specific criterion D of section 4, which Ebola disease complies with. 5) To be assigned to category E, a disease needs to comply with criteria of section 1, 2 or 3 of Annex IV of the AHL and/or the surveillance of the disease is necessary for reasons relating 
to animal health, animal welfare, human health, the economy, society or the environment. The latter is applicable if a disease fulfils the criteria as in Article 5, which Ebola disease complies with.
Assessment of Article 8
This section presents the results of the assessment on the criteria of Article 8(3) of the AHL about Ebola virus disease. The Article 8(3) criteria are about animal species to be listed, as it reads below:
'3. Animal species or groups of animal species shall be added to this list if they are affected or if they pose a risk for the spread of a specific listed disease because: a) they are susceptible for a specific listed disease or scientific evidence indicates that such susceptibility is likely; or b) they are vector species or reservoirs for that disease, or scientific evidence indicates that such role is likely'.
For this reason, the assessment on Article 8 criteria is based on the evidence as extrapolated from the relevant criteria of Article 7, i.e. the ones related to susceptible and reservoir species or routes of transmission, which cover also possible role of biological or mechanical vectors. 2 According to the mapping, as presented in Table 5 , Section 3.2 of the scientific opinion on the ad hoc methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017), the main animal species to be listed for Ebola virus disease according to the criteria of Article 8(3) of the AHL are as displayed in Table 18 . Sus scrofa 2 A vector is a living organism that transmits an infectious agent from an infected animal to a human or another animal. Vectors are frequently arthropods. Biological vectors may carry pathogens that can multiply within their bodies and be delivered to new hosts, usually by biting. In mechanical vectors, the pathogens do not multiply within the vector, which usually remains infected for shorter time than in biological vectors.
4.
Conclusions TOR 1: for each of those diseases an assessment, following the criteria laid down in Article 7 of the AHL, on its eligibility of being listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL;
• According to the assessment here performed, Ebola complies with all criteria of the first set and with two criteria of the second set and therefore can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL.
TOR 2a: for each of the diseases which was found eligible to be listed for Union intervention, an assessment of its compliance with each of the criteria in Annex IV to the AHL for the purpose of categorisation of diseases in accordance with Article 9 of the AHL;
• According to the assessment here performed, Ebola meets the criteria as in sections 4 and 5 of Annex IV of the AHL, for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to in points (d) and (e) of Article 9(1) of the AHL.
TOR 2b: for each of the diseases which was found eligible to be listed for Union intervention, a list of animal species that should be considered candidates for listing in accordance with Article 8 of the AHL;
• According to the assessment here performed, the animal species that can be considered to be listed for Ebola according to Article 8(3) of the AHL are some species of non-human primates, pigs and rodents as susceptible species and some species of fruit bats as reservoir, as reported in Table 18 in Section 3.4 of the present document.
